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2.2 The concept of responsibility in ethics and social studies of science and technology

2. The concept of responsibility in ethics and social studies of science and technology

 

During the 20^th century, it became increasingly clear that ethical theories of individual responsibility cannot fully capture contemporary ethical and social challenges of scientific, technological and organizational developments. Traditionally, ethical thinking was based on the idea of attributing responsibility to an autonomous individual based on evaluations of the intentional actions of this individual. Today, however, individuals very often take on responsibility for actions which are framed in terms of professional responsibilities in highly organized settings. Moreover, due to the ever-increasing social and technoscientific complexity, very often it is virtually impossible to assess the full of range of actions involved in particular circumstances, less alone predict possible risks and outcomes. How we deal with unintended consequences of science and technology seems to be more important today than ever.

 

In a paper addressing urgent ethical and social problems in relation to science and technology Réne von Schomberg (2007) argues that in increasing number of instances it is impossible, even in hierarchically structured technical professional systems, to assign any one person responsibility for producing or solving some particular problem. Who was responsible for the production and utilization of asbestos in buildings, making many people ill with asbestoses? Who bears responsibility for technological disasters such as Chernobyl and Challenger? And what about more mundane technical problems such as the spread of computer viruses or the break-down of one’s car?

 

Such complex, socio-technical questions cannot be answered if we base our conception of responsibility on the idea of autonomous individuals and simple, well-defined social situations. More generally, we would say that the attribution of responsibility is a means of reducing complexity in social action (Lenk & Maring, 2000). Taking on or placing responsibilities, then, are ways of making explicit ethical and social implications of science and technology in professional settings and on a broad societal level. Responsibility has consequences for the scientific and engineering professions but also for the way in society incorporates technology.

 

Many different actors have made a call for responsible nanoscience and nanotechnology. The 2004 communication of the European Commission aiming towards a European strategy for for nanotechnology declared: “Nanotechnology must be developed in a safe and responsible manner” (p. 3). In chapter 3 we review different stakeholder positions on responsibility. In this chapter, we address questions concerning nanotechnology and responsibility on more general levels. First, we take a look at some philosophical points regarding professional role responsibility of scientists and engineers and collective responsibility with respect to technological innovation. Then, we survey work on sustainability, precaution, and governance with a particular emphasis on nanotechnology.

2.1 Philosophical debate on responsibility and technology

 

We first need to clarify that primarily we are dealing with ethical responsibility rather than legal, regulatory, or financial responsibilities. Although these issues cannot be fully separated, in particular when it comes to defining responsibilities for future developments, the latter forms of responsibility usually entail more or less institutionalized modes of accountability. In contrast, we think about – and assume – moral responsibility because we claim that, in some way, we need to respond to current developments and answer for our actions in other, less formalized ways. Arguably, this may seem like a more vague way of inferring responsibilities. Nevertheless, we usually accept that we are morally responsible for actions which are not covered by the more formal systems of responsibility and accountability.

 

In 1979, the German philosopher Hans Jonas raised the issue of moral responsibility in a technologically shaped world (Jonas, 1979).[1] He argued that rapid progress in 20^th century science and technology had for the first time given humankind the powers to influence and damage the biosphere on earth. Therefore, an ethical principle of responsibility, rather than a codified ethics of responsibility, had become necessary. This principle would not only entail ethical prescriptions of responsible individual behaviour such the Kantian imperative whereby all one’s actions should aspire to become some kind of universal law. In effect, Jonas formulated a new, collective imperative of responsibility: “Act so that the effects of your actions are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life.”

 

Hans Jonas placed great emphasis on the need for foresight and future scenarios. Negative scenarios should in his view be given greater credibility and have more consequences for policy measures than positive scenarios. Jonas also suggested prohibiting all activities which, intentionally or unintentionally, could lead to the extinction of the human race, as a kind of generalised version of the commandment in Jewish and Christian religion: “You shall not kill.” He has been criticised for his pessimistic vision, and the critique has made it clear that while Jonas’ approach was a way of raising awareness of technological risks, it also produced a “heuristic of fear” inadequate for deciding about responsible technology (Grunwald, 2008; Jonas, 1980).

 

The call for responsible technology also reverberated with philosophers and organization sociologists who took an interest in the role responsibility of scientists and engineers. Establishing a difference between free moral agents and individuals acting in professional roles, philosophers Albert Flores and Deborah G. Johnson (1983) argued that “the fact that behaviour is role-governed does not insulate a collective’s member from the responsibility that the collective bears” (p. 543). Along the same lines, Daryl Chubin (1985) argued that scientific and engineering bodies had to adopt frameworks of role responsibility for scientists and engineers, i.e., ethical norms, codes of conduct, etc. To Chubin, enacting such norms simply meant replacing implicit with explicit role responsibility ethics. Somewhat later, John Braxton (1994) picked up on this idea, envisioning a “trans-scientific community” based on role responsibility.

 

The notion of professional role responsibility and the need to enact explicit norms have been translated to the question concerning responsible nanotechnology. Robert Lee and P.D. Jose (2008) identified a potential conflict of role responsibilities for corporate managers dealing with nanotechnology. On the one hand, managers need to consider the competitiveness and profitability of the company; on the other hand, taking into account long-term interests, they also need to behave in a socially and environmentally responsible way. The tension between the self-interest of corporations in bringing innovative technologies to the market and the self-restraint in promoting responsible and socially robust technologies can be dealt with in certain ways:

 

1. Creating internal ethical and best practice standards consistent with external stakeholders demands
2. Investing in strategic risk research
3. Monitoring warning signals and forecasting trends
4. Creating codes of conduct with external partners, especially in cases where the ability of firms to respond in an individual capacity is limited due to cost or complexity considerations.

 

Reviewing the literature on professional role responsibility, Carl Mitcham (2003) concludes that it may be useful to think in terms of a kind of distributed, process-oriented “co-responsibility” (see also below). He argues that the very concept of professional role responsibility may be too limited for the dynamic nature of technological innovation and risk assessments. Instead, we need to implement collective responsibility for professional as well as non-professional groupings, all the while taking into account feedbacks and new developments in the technology.

 

Many philosophers have dealt with the notion of collective responsibility. Philosophers such as David Copp (1980), Margaret Gilbert (2000), and Russel Hardin (1988) have argued the need to consider collectives as independent moral agents, while Seumas Miller (2001) conceived of collective responsibility as joint responsibility of individual human persons. Larry May speaks about the “web of commitments” in which all individuals find themselves embedded (May, 1996). The collective approach has profound implications for professionals. Whereas, traditionally, the professional was an occupational self-governing, high status person, most professionals, today, are employed in, or affiliated with, organizations that are influenced and governed by complex external and internal interests. No one is free from multiple, perhaps even conflicting, commitments, nor from the challenges of differing professional and personal identities and even incompatible epistemic cultures and moral priorities (Abbott, 1988; Knorr-Cetina, 1999).

 

According to May (1996), acknowledging the consequences of living in a “web of commitments” makes it necessary to understand professional responsibilities as “legitimate negotiated compromises”. However, this does not imply loss of responsibility. On the contrary, professionals as well as their organizations should strive to identify and communicate possible conflicts in the “web of commitments” in order to reach temporary consensus on responsibilities.

 

The collective, process-oriented view on responsibility is shared by René von Schomberg who in 2007 published a working document on ethics of knowledge policy. He criticised contemporary ethical theories for not adequately capturing the ethical and social challenges of scientific and technological development. The unintended consequences of science and technology as well as the implications of collective actions can not be addressed adequately by these existing theories which deal with individual responsibility for intentional actions. Four developments illustrate these shortcomings:

 

1)      Division of labour has increased the number of different roles of individuals involved in technology development;

2)      The area for which each individual can be held responsible is narrowed;

3)      Each individual can play many different roles in society;

4)      The institutional spheres in which role differentiation takes place have become more distinct and separated. Regulation of each sphere is the responsibility of the professionals who are active inside it.

 

Von Schomberg argued that due to these shortcomings it is necessary to shift to an ethics of forward-looking, collective co-responsibility involving the whole of society. This new ethics has four dimensions: Public debate; Technology Assessment; Constitutional Change; Foresight and Knowledge Assessment.As we later explain, these dimensions are already being implicated in the development of nanosciences and nanotechnologies. The idea of future-oriented, collective co-responsibility is also very much present in the following discussion about precaution, sustainability, and governance of nanotechnologies.

2.2 Precaution

 

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development adopted by the United Nations Conference, 3-14 June 1992, codified for the first time on the global level the precautionary approach:

 

Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation (United Nations Environment Programme, 1992, p. Principle 15)

 

In the EU, the concept of the precautionary principle was set out in a Commission communication adopted in February 2000. The report concluded that the precautionary principle was widely applicable to specific cases where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain, and where a preliminary scientific evaluation shows that potentially dangerous effects for the environment and human, animal or plant health can reasonably be feared (European Commission 2000).

 

The precautionary principle is a rationale for precautionary action. Precautionary measures are always provisional and have to be updated and modified as long as new scientific evidence becomes available (Schomberg, 2006). We need to avoid the common misunderstandings, on the one hand, that the precautionary principle is a one-sided argument for the elimination of all adverse effect on health and environment, or, on the other hand, that the precautionary principle is a threat to the foundation of technological progress (Harremoës, 2005).

 

Certain criteria can be applied to the kinds of actions and revisions deemed necessary in order to accommodate precautionary approaches. The European Commission (2000) provides the following list (p. 4):

 

• Proportional to the chosen level of protection,
• Non-discriminatory in their application,
• Consistent with similar measures already taken,
• Based on an examination of the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action (including, where appropriate and feasible, an economic cost/benefit analysis),
• Subject to review, in the light of new scientific data, and
• Capable of assigning responsibility for producing the scientific evidence necessary for a more comprehensive risk assessment.

 

The Health Council of the Netherlands (2008) recently published an advice to the Dutch government on prudent implementation of the precautionary principle. They distinguish weak and strong forms of the precautionary principle. In strong interpretations such as by Hans Jonas, potential negative consequences should be given more weight than potential positive consequences in situations of uncertainty. Experts on decision making have formulated the maximin-rule. Decision makers must only let themselves be guided by potential negative consequences of options for actions, and choose the one with the least negative expected impact. The committee of the Health Council responsible for the advice does not favour this or any other general rule for deciding under uncertainty. They believe that potential negative consequences must not by definition weigh heavier than potential positive consequences, because choosing not to strive for potential benefits may lead to other risks. They consider the precautionary principle to be a transparent way to weigh pros and cons of the variety of available options for actions.

 

There are three distinct but interrelated cases where policy makers are confronted with special challenges: ambiguity, uncertainty and complexity. Ambiguity means there are diverging value judgments. Normative and interpretative ambiguity is distinguished. Normative ambiguity implies differences in ethical acceptance; interpretative ambiguity implies differences in evaluation of research results. Uncertainty can exist on hazard properties, exposure, type and size of potential damage and chance of occurrence. Sources of uncertainty include variability of phenomena and lack of knowledge. Complexity implies difficulties to form a qualitatively and quantitatively good picture of the impacts of a variety of potential causes and effects, given available information.

 

The three cases require different policy approaches. Ambiguity requires discussion and debate for identifying common values; foster understanding; and look for options that enable people to practice their own vision. Uncertainty asks for implementation of the precautionary principle, if it is a serious obstacle for decision making. Complexity requires a multidisciplinary discourse among scientific and experience experts to form as good a picture as possible of the issues at stake.

 

The precautionary principle must therefore be applied in cases of uncertainty with plausible risks. The plausibility of risks must be determined by experts, who are open for critical questions and remarks of non-experts and communicate openly on what is uncertain. The decision whether or not to act and the appropriate response in a give situation, however, remain a political issue dependent on the risk level that is acceptable to the society on which the risks are being imposed.

 

The Health Council of the Netherlands (2008) advises a judgment and decision making process for risk governance consisting of several steps:

 

• Specification
• Collection & Analysis
• Characterisation
• Decision & Evaluation
• Communication
• Management

 

The process includes different cycles which can be run through depending on the problem at stake. Communication plays a central role.

 

The precautionary principle has been proposed for application to nanotechnology. In 2003 the Canada-based ETC Group (2003) used the precautionary principle to recommend a moratorium on the commercial production of new nanomaterials. The Group also called for an international process evaluating the socio-economic, health and environmental implications of nanotechnology (p. 74). More recently, the European Trade Union Confederation (2008) adopted a resolution demanding that the precautionary approach be taken with respect to nanotechnologies and nanomaterials.

 

Within the framework of medicine and health, the Swiss Reinsurance Company (2004) has advocated applying the precautionary principle to nanotechnology. Among other things, the company suggested the following activities designed to shift the burden of proof to the proponents of nanotechnology:

 

1. The handling of nanotechnologically manufactured substances should be carefully assessed and accompanied by appropriate protective measures.
2. No reasonable expense should be spared in clarifying the current uncertainties associated with nanotechnological risks (p. 47).

 

Also on a limited scale of application, the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering (2004) recommended precautionary measures with respect to nanoparticles (see also: Grunwald, 2008). All factories and laboratories should treat manufactured nanoparticles and nanotubes as if they were hazardous and reduce them from waste streams. Moreover, the use of free nanoparticles in environmental applications such as remediation of groundwater should be prohibited (p. 9).

 

In the same vein, Andre Del a pioneer in nanomedicine at the University of California, Los Angeles, said:

 

While it is likely that most nanomaterials will be safe from a biological perspective, we need to demonstrate this is the case as a matter of precautionary principle. As a rational approach to the problem, we should establish predictable paradigms of toxicity that can help to classify these materials into those that are likely to be safe and those that could be hazardous (Stoddart, 2006).

 

Reviewing transnational, legislative models for regulation of nanotechnology, Gary E. Marchant and Douglas J. Sylvester (2006) took a sceptical stance towards the application of the precautionary principle to nanotechnology for three reasons:

 

1. Since there are no standard or globally accepted versions of the precautionary principle, it does not provide a robust or reliable foundation for transnational regulation.
2. Every version of the precautionary principle is ambiguous with respect central risk management decisions. Thus, there is a great deal of interpretative flexibility in enacting the precautionary principle(s).
3. Applied in the stronger version, the precautionary principle would prevent nanotechnology from moving forward. Because of novelty and scale, all emerging nanotechnologies entail some level of risk and could never satisfy the precautionary principle (p. 721).

 

They conclude that a range of less formal alternatives may be more likely to succeed in the shorter term:

 

• Transnational dialogue and information sharing forums
• “Civil-society-based-monitoring”
• Codes of conduct
• Enlisting a group of expert to issue periodic reviews
• International consensus standards
• Export controls
• Confidence building measures

 

In theory, such measures could be seen as a way of distributing responsibility for formulating each of the four dimensions of the precautionary principle described above. To some extent, the effectiveness of such measures is contingent upon on agreement between the actors involved which may be one of the greatest hindrances to adopting precautionary measures within nanotechnology.

 

Based on qualitative interviews with four groups of stakeholders in Norway, Throne-Holst and Sto (2008) found substantially different interpretations of the precautionary principle. Norway has a strong tradition for promoting the precautionary principle. As early as 1997, the Norwegian Parliament adopted the strong version of the precautionary principle in relation to cloning. Despite the strong political affiliation with the precautionary principle in Norway, the majority of stakeholders interviewed by Throne-Holst and Sto were reluctant to relegate responsibility to the political level. Although agreeing that, in principle, the responsibility for adopting the precautionary principle had to be distributed, they still felt that more information and scientific evidence was needed before politicians, NGOs, and others could understand relevance of choices. This was even the opinion of some politicians.

 

When scientific data is scarce and/or uncertain, a range of risk management options are available to decision-makers (Tyshenko & Krewski, 2008). Other principles besides the precautionary principle include ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) and BACT (best available control technology). Monitoring programs, regulations and standards, and voluntary guidelines may also be useful measures in adopting a precautionary strategy towards nanotechnology.

 

In their survey of 40 Swiss and German companies producing nanoparticulate materials, Aasgeir Helland, Hans Kastenholz, and Michael Siegrist (2008) found disagreement with respect to placing responsibility for precaution. Among the respondents, there was no majority opinion regarding whether the burden of proof should be on the company or not. A vast majority accepted the ALARA principle. Also, there was widespread acceptance that measures should be taken if specific criteria of potential irreversibility are fulfilled. For the respondents, however, adopting the strong version of the precautionary principle in industry was not seen as the right way to move ahead. This result supports the Norwegian study cited above as well as an earlier study of European industry showing that most industries find regulatory interventions regarding nanoparticulate materials useful if they are voluntary and evidence-based (Helland, Kastenholz, Thidell, Arnfalk, & Deppert, 2006).

 

Thomas Faunce and colleagues (2008) have analysed how the Australian authorities have and should have applied the precautionary principle in their decision to allow sunscreens with nanoparticles on the market. Jennifer Kuzma and John Besley (2008) have argued that risk assessment should not only take into account traditional utilitarian aspects such as health, environmental and economic impacts, but also the value choices of actors taking into account principles such as integrity, justice, non-maleficence and autonomy.

2.3 Sustainability

 

Like precaution, the concept of sustainable development has a long history with many dimensions and ambiguities (Mitcham, 1995). Sustainability has been reflected in regard to energy, research and innovation policies, business practices, product development, and consumption. The most widely used definition of sustainable development has been proposed by the Brundtland Commission: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland Commission, 1987).

 

Taking sustainability into account, the development of nanotechnologies has to include not only considerations of the probability and extent of possible damages (and goods), but also criteria of acceptable levels of uncertainty, intra- and inter-generational justice, reversibility and delay effects, and potential of discursive mobilization and participation of may different actor groups (Helland & Kastenholz, 2008).

 

Responsible development of nanotechnology is often considered to be also sustainable development. However, it is important to recognize that technological innovation is embedded within a wide constellation of societal activities and actors. Who gets to define “the needs of the present” as well as the needs of “future generations” is always an open question. Therefore, questions pertaining to the sustainability of nanotechnology also relates closely to the mobilization and enrolment of stakeholders and other involved parties into decision-making processes (Helland & Kastenholz, 2008; Meaney, 2006).

 

There seems to be some agreement that sustainable development of nanotechnology requires technology assessment and life cycle analyses. In order to assess the sustainability of nanotechnology, Torsten Fleischer and Armin Grunwald (2008) stress the need to distinguish between various levels of nanotechnology. They identify four levels of interdependences in the complex and heterogeneous set of nanotechnologies applied to or using systems at the nanoscale:

 

1. Nanomaterials: The “small” set of original nanotechnology products such as nanoparticles for medical applications.
2. Enabling technology for other key technologies: Nanotechnology applied in the “macro” fields of energy technologies, water technologies, life sciences, and/or ICTs.
3. Enabling technology for other complex technological systems: Nanotechnology as part of converging technologies (NBIC), pervasive computing, and/or biochemical analyses.
4. Nanotechnology in the wider societal framework.

 

Fleischer and Grunwald (2008) argue that the question concerning sustainability differs from level to level. In particular, they emphasise the need to take into account not only environmental sustainability, but also economic and social sustainability effects. Technology assessment, i.e., the provision of knowledge and orientation for future acting and decision-making concerning technology and its implementation in society, is one way of intentionally shaping the different levels of nanotechnology in a sustainable manner. An important part of providing sound anticipatory technology assessments, current eco-assessments procedures such as life cycle analysis offer a range of detailed methods to obtain such knowledge and orientation. However, since many nanotechnologies are still more or less unknown and untested, traditional technology assessment methods have to be replaced with more future- and innovation-oriented techniques that directly feed into the development processes they pertain to describe. Designating the novel approach to nanotechnology assessment, Fleischer and Grunwald use the term “reflexive sustainability assessment of nanotechnology” (p. 896).

 

This view finds some support (Sengul, Theis, & Ghosh, 2008; Sweet & Strohm, 2006; Wardak & Gorman, 2006). Arnim von Gleich, Michael Steinfeldt, and Ulrich Petschow (2008) agree on the need to develop a three-tiered approach to prospective nanotechnology assessment:

 

1. Technology characterisation: Prospective assessment of nanotechnologies with respect to opportunities and hazards
2. Eco-profiles: Evaluation of eco- and resource-efficiency potentials by application of life cycle assessments
3. Orientation through “Leitbilder”: Influencing the development of technologies, processes, and products through discursive explication of vision statements that integrate aspects of health, safety, and environment (p. 900).

 

C. Bauer et al. (2008) develop a framework for life cycle analysis of nanotechnologies in the face of uncertain knowledge about future applications and implications. Importantly, moving beyond the described life cycle analysis methodology in ISO 14040, they argue that economic and social as well as environmental aspects need to be taken into account. Based on their proposed model, they perform two case studies of surface coating using physical vapour deposition and of the use of carbon nanotubes in electronics, respectively. The first study concerns nanotechnology quite close to the producer of nano-based products. This study suggests that the release of nanoparticles to the environment is unlikely due to vacuum conditions in the coating plants, but also that redesigning the technology might increase the yield in using target material. The second, and broader, study addresses a large array of issues for a nano-based product that faces market introduction, including decisions about replacement of existing products.

 

Another case study comparing innovation and sustainability is provided by Fred Steward, Joyce Tsoi, and Anne-Marie Coles (2008). They identify three types of nano-based innovations with application to “print-on-paper”: ink, fiber, and coatings. Their results based on a socio-technical analysis of the emerging network promoting these innovations, indicate that primary role of the nanoparticle innovations is for “commercial printability rather sustainable deinkability” (p. 957). Even though the authors recognize that the lack of nanotechnological innovation relevant to deinkability may be due to technical difficulties, they still find enough evidence to suggest that the aspirations for nanoparticle innovations contributing to sustainability goals are not as yet being translated into practice.

 

In the case of layered silicate biopolymer nanocomposites, however, it seems that nanoclay production may actually improve the sustainability of common biopolymer products by reducing energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. Still, other parameters seem to point in the other direction. In comparing nanoclay-biopolymer composites with conventional fiber-biopolymer composites, Satish Joshi (2008)discovers that on a per kilogram basis “the environmental burdens from nanoclays are worse than those from natural fibers in most dimensions except phosphate and nitrate emissions, but nanoclay are better than glass fibers from an energy perspective” (p. 487). As the relative performance depends on the functional unit, Joshi recommends detailed product-specific life cycle analyses.

 

Analysing the development of the nanotechnology funding strategy in Germany, Axel Zweck, Gerd Bachmann, Wolfgang Luther,  and Christiane Ploetz (2008) find that, indeed, sustainability aspects are becoming more widely accepted. In particular, they identify several overlaps between the national sustainability strategy adopted by the German Government in 2001 and the nanotechnology activities funded by the German Ministry for Education and Research between 1995and 2006. Despite the general image of sustainability and innovation as two separate cultures, the authors conclude that links between sustainability concerns and technological developments evolved over time. They recommend more research and development programs that explicitly aim at contributing to sustainability such as the recent Framework Programme “Research for Sustainability”, enacted by the German Ministry for Education and Research in 2004.

 

Japanese and Chinese governments have also taken initiatives to investigate social and environmental aspects of nanotechnology aiming at public acceptance of nanotechnologies, but also at evaluation of impacts of nanotechnology on health and environment (Takemura, 2008; Zhao, Zhao, & Wang, 2008). In the case of the UK, Tee Rogers-Hayden and Nick Pidgeon (2008) argue that the road to sustainable nanotechnology necessarily has to lead through more “up-stream” public participation engaging the public as the technology develops. The tendency of articulating sustainability in relation to other aspects is also found in the German case. H. van Lente and J.I. van Til (2008) argue that sustainability might need other discursive “vehicles” in order to become a more prominent concern of governments, stakeholders, and others.

2.4 Governance

 

Sustainability seems to have gained some importance at the level of technology assessments (including life cycle analyses) and even, to a lesser extent, in policy-making. Most research into the sustainability of nanotechnologies indicates that achieving sustainability requires participation of a wide range of societal actors. Thus, it may be useful to think in terms of responsible (if not sustainable) governance of nanotechnologies.

 

Governance is a broadening of the concept of government. Government is the formal authority in a State, with legislative, policy making and executive powers. Governance encompasses processes of organising a country or other territory involving other stakeholders than just formal government bodies. With regard to nanotechnology, the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) has proposed and applied a specific concept of Risk Governance aimed at the identification, assessment, management and communication of risks in a broad context (Renn, 2005):

 

Risk governance includes the totality of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analysed and communicated, and how management decisions are taken. Encompassing the combined risk-relevant decisions and actions of both governmental and private actors, risk governance is of particular importance in, but not restricted to, situations where there is no single authority to take a binding risk management decision but where, instead, the nature of the risk requires the collaboration of, and co-ordination between, a range of different stakeholders. Risk governance however not only includes a multifaceted, multi-actor risk process but also calls for the consideration of contextual factors such as institutional arrangements (e.g. the regulatory and legal framework that determines the relationship, roles and responsibilities of the actors and co-ordination mechanisms such as markets, incentives or self-imposed norms) and political culture, including different perceptions of risk (p. 22).

 

The IRGC Risk Governance Framework consists of five elements:

 

• Risk pre-assessment
• Risk appraisal
• Characterisation and evaluation
• Risk Management
• Risk Communication

 

The relevant knowledge includes not only traditional risk assessment knowledge, but also insight in human concerns associated with risks and communication and dialogue. IRGC has applied this Risk Governance Framework to nanotechnologies (O. Renn & M. Roco, 2006; O. Renn & M. C. Roco, 2006). They distinguish four generations of nanotechnologies:

 

• Passive (steady function) nanostructures (from 2000)
• Active (evolving function) nanostructures and nanodevices (from 2005)
• Integrated nanosystems (systems of nanosystems) (after 2010)
• Heterogeneous molecular nanosystems (after 2015)

 

The first generation passive nanotechnologies require another governance framework (Frame One, characterised by traditional risk governance methods) than later generations of active nanotechnologies (Frame Two, characterised more by (public) concern governance).

 

W.E. Bijker, et al. (2007), who all served on an ad hoc committee on the health significance of nanotechnologies (Health Council of the Netherlands, 2006), criticize the temporal framework provided by the IRGC white paper on nanotechnologies. They argue that there is no, a priori relation between the time of development of a particular kind of nanotechnology and the type of risk issue that pertains to it. If so, only future nanotechnology products would generate uncertain and ambiguous risk issues necessitating more public concern governance. Bijker, et al. (2007) maintain that “it is the purpose and the application rather than the device itself that may create the risk” (p. 1219).

 

The report by the Health Council of the Netherlands (HCN) (2006) use the five different process levels of the first IRGC white paper on which to base risk governance processes involving nanotechnologies (pre-assessment, appraisals, characterization and evaluation, management, and communication). The report also use the four risk categories provided by the original IRGC white paper to categorize risk problems:

 

Risk category	Risk problems
Simple	Privacy problems Self-tests Toxicity of readily degradable nanoparticles
Complex	Sustainability Gap between rich and poor
Uncertain	Toxicity of poorly degradable nanoparticles
Ambigious	Gap between diagnostic and therapeutic capabilities Advance home-care technology Human enhancement Some military applications of nanotechnologies

Table 1 Categorisation of risk problems that arise from or are intensified by nanotechnology applications using the risk categories of the IRGC (Health Council of the Netherlands, 2006, p. 86).

 

The IRGC Risk Governance framework has also been criticised for looking too exclusively at nanotechnologies pertaining to medical health and environment, thus overlooking social safety and social risk isssues. Based on an analysis of IRGC documents, Wolbring (2007) conclude that “the IRGC discourse (scope and inclusiveness) is less than satisfactory for marginalized groups such as disabled people, indigenous people and marginalized groups from the South as their issues and their views are totally ignored” (p. 19). One such attempt to construct meaningful upstream engagement in nanotechnology of otherwise marginalized groups are the nano-dialogues organized by Demos, Practical Actions, and researchers from the University of Lancaster (Demos, 2007).

 

Kamilla Kjølberg, Gian Carlo Delgado-Ramos, Fern Wickson, and Roger Strand (2008) identify four dimensions according to which ideas about governance of nanotechnologies may differ. One is the conceptualization of time which so clearly made a difference between the IRGC and the HCN. The three other dimensions are: 1) Uncertainty, 2) Complexity in terms of higher-order effects, and 3) Complexity with respect to values.The authors use these four categories to analyse two visions and recommendations on the development of converging technologies (CT), one American and one European. Conceiving temporal development in terms of technological development, the American report (the result of a conference) emphasized the need for rapid technological development, brushing aside most issues relating to uncertainty about the future, complexity of higher-order effects and values. In stark contrast, the European equivalent (the outcome of a foresight exercise commissioned by the EC Directorate K “Knowledge-based economy and society”) amounts to strong social commitment and involvement in the development of CT. Accordingly, the report stresses radical uncertainties, unexpected and undesirable higher-order effects, including feedbacks between the physical and social/cultural world. Kjølberg, Delgado-Ramos, Wickson, and Strand (2008) conclude that (European) approach translates into the following recommendation of governance: “Consensus, resolution of conflict, and political efficiency should not by governance design override the need for real resistance, conflict and change at the fundamental level of policy” (p. 95).